28 февр. 2014 г.

Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety. Eric Schlosser

Nuclear bombs must be handled with the proper care, yet that is not al­ways the case. Mentioning harrowing mishaps in the history of the American atomic arsenal, Schlosser singles out one for detailed dramat­ization, the explosion in 1980 of a Titan II missile. Some airmen were killed and injured, but since the warhead didn’t detonate, the safety sys­tem appeared to have worked. Color Schlosser skeptical, for, as he re­counts this accident, which began with a mundane incident—a dropped tool that punctured the missile—he delves into nuclear weapon designs. Those are influenced by the requirement that the bomb must always detonate when desired and never when not. Citing experts in the tech­nology of nuclear weaponry who have pondered the “never” part of the requirement, Schlosser highlights their worry about an accidental nucle­ar explosion. Underscored by cases of dropped, burned, and lost bombs, the problem of designing a safe but reliable bomb persists (see also The Bomb, 2009, by weapons engineer Stephen Younger). Well re­searched, reported, and written, this contribution to the nucle­ar-weapons literature demonstrates the versatility of Schlosser, author of Fast Food Nation

A New York Times Notable Book of 2013